T he current way of accessing digital content and services, such as those provided by smartphones, tablets, and laptops, is to carry gadgets everywhere we go. However, the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) is making our environment more and more connected with the digital world. Examples of current systems include building automation, surveillance systems, smart homes, and so on. At the same time, wearable devices such as smart watches or clothes as well as body-embedded medical devices such as blood sugar sensors, heartbeat sensors, pacemakers, and so forth connect our everyday activities to the digital world. This development is irreversibly changing the relationship between people and the digital world. Furthermore, advancing communication technologies such as 5G 1 and edge computing 2 support this development with increasing performance, reliability, and coverage.
A NEW DIGITAL PARADIGM
Altogether, this development is driving us toward the new digital paradigm of a hyperconnected world, where the environment is intelligent enough to offer user-intended services that can be acquired in a ubiquitous manner without gadgets (this is also termed the naked world). This vision is under investigation in the Naked Approach project. 3 In the gadget-free world, users live without gadgets in the digital world, accessing their desired services through user interfaces and computational capabilities embedded in the environment. This leads us to the evolution from device-centric to user-centric service approaches. This gadget-free hyperconnectivity requires radical enhancements in various enabling technologies, as highlighted in Figure 1 . For example, user interaction will take place directly between the user and the environment without personal devices. This requires new types of interactive modalities and user authentication mechanisms.
In the case of personal gadgets, the user authentication is straightforward (either entering a PIN code or a pattern or using a fingerprint reader to access the gadget), but with the smart environments it is more complicated. Since it is not feasible to separately authenticate users at each smart object in a smart space, trusted single-sign-on mechanisms are needed. 4 In the envisioned gadget-free world, authentication needs to be effortless for the user and should happen in a natural way. 5 Thus, the significance of different authentication 
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Carry-On Identities FIGURE 1. The various enhancements required in the transition to a gadget-free world. UI: user interface.
methods based on recognizing biometric characteristics of persons entering the spaces, such as image/video recognition and implanted chips, will grow. In the current cloud computing model, the service logic and data are moved from end-user devices to large centralized data centers that have global availability. Due to centralized data management, the systems are more vulnerable to cyberattacks against privacy, availability of services, and even safety. We are living in a world where our data and the data collected from our devices are ruthlessly exploited by different actors around the world. Because the IoT now surrounds us almost everywhere, attackers have further tools to intrude into our daily life activities or even threaten our health (for example, medical/health-monitoring or driverassisting car applications).
Therefore, it would be beneficial to limit the propagation of personal data and computation to local networks when universal availability is not needed. This is also one important driving factor for edge computing. The gadget-free hyperconnected world will be built on the concept of edge and fog 6 computing that push computational and storage capacity closer to users. In a nutshell, the evolution from a gadget-centric to gadget-free world, together with rapid technological advancements, requires a unified communication architecture that enables secure, flexible, adaptable, and autonomous service composition based on the current needs of the users. In this article, we first briefly introduce the three-level communication and services architecture upon which our security architecture will be built, and then we identify the security threats at each layer of that architecture. Based on the threat analysis, we propose a threetier security architecture for secure user accessibility of desired digital services in such a gadget-free environment.
THREE-TIER GADGET-FREE COMMUNICATION AND SERVICES ARCHITECTURE
The concept of the gadget-free hyperconnected world mainly refers to a fully digital society, where user-centric services can be accessed anytime and anywhere without any explicit gadgets. Smart sensors, actuators, and potential printed electronics are embedded in the local environment to deliver some of the basic and most frequently used services locally. However, various computational services have different functional requirements for the platform, so some of the services and computations are optimally located at data centers while, for others, it is optimal to locate them closer to the edge. These requirements include maximum allowed latency, minimum bandwidth, range of availability, and so forth. Therefore, based on various service requirements, we define a three-tier communication and services architecture, as presented in Figure 2 .
Tier 1-Local network
This is considered the lowest tier and refers to the local-level network in the proposed architecture. This tier mainly comprises various types of low-power sensor and actuator nodes that can provide various services and functionalities. Some of the local nodes can provide local microservices for other nodes and/or a gateway functionality to connect the local network to the tier-2 networks as local edge cloud services. At the local network, the user will be able to access less demanding computational services, such as switching on and off a room light based on movement, local shared storage and caching, or sensor data fusion and filtering.
Tier 2: Edge network
This tier provides the connectivity from the local network to the Internet and also provides localized computational services requiring more computational capacity than tier 1 can provide. This tier provides the radio access network and the multiaccess edge computing (MEC) services based on the edge cloud. Tier 2 provides the intermediary tier for cloud computing between the local edge cloud and a centralized cloud, offering high computational capacity combined with ultralow latency, provided by an underlying 5G radio access network. This tier is vital in providing elastic resources and services for gadgetless hyperconnected networking.
Tier 3: Global network
This tier includes the traditional centralized cloud service backbone (public Internet) that provides a globally available service platform for applications WE PROPOSE A THREE-TIER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR SECURE USER ACCESSIBILITY OF DESIRED DIGITAL SERVICES.
requiring high storage and computational capacity.
The local infrastructure will be crucial because most of the services are embedded locally near users' proximity. In the gadget-free services, low-latency and high data-rate communications would be the key requirements to consider. In the local infrastructure, network clusters are autonomously established by nearby nodes, and they are very dynamic: nodes can join and leave anytime. The local network may also contain some more resourceful nodes to perform high-computational tasks. For example, these high-capability nodes are useful for user authentication at the local layer and can also act as a gateway node to connect with the edge networks (clouds) for higher-computational services. Nodes in the local infrastructure are also connected to the global infrastructure (public Internet) for even higher-resourced services.
The public acceptance of this vision can happen only when strong security solutions are in place. The security mechanism must provide various security features such as authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and services. Thus, each of the tiers in the defined network architecture needs to be protected against various attacks. Tier 3 (public Internet) is so far the most explored in terms of security challenges and respective solutions. Security threats at tier 2 (edge cloud) are the subject of current ongoing research, and various attacks have already been highlighted. The identification of the potential security challenges in tier 1 (local edge cloud) is the least explored area at the moment among all. 
THREAT VECTORS
We have identified seven major potential threat vectors based on a three-tier gadget-free architecture, as highlighted in Figure 2 . As per the scope of this article, this section focuses only on the threats related to user accessibility and authentication. Moreover, we discuss the possible solutions to mitigate the identified threats. Table 1 summarizes the potential attacks and their consequences for the discussed threat vectors.
Threat vector 1 (V1): Vulnerabilities on nodes in local subnet cluster
This can be triggered by malicious nodes or local adversaries. Invalid low-power nodes might get access to the subnet cluster in the local networks. There also might be a case where some of the nodes could be more resource constrained and cannot support high-requirement security mechanism/cryptographic operations such as authentication/key management and bootstrapping. 7 Solving these threats requires a secure, light weight node-to-node authentication mechanism. Considering this architecture, the local nodes cluster should also contain a "guard node" (also termed an agent node). This node will be responsible for monitoring the behavior of nodes at the local cluster, detecting malicious activities, and providing necessary security resources to more resource-constrained environments.
To assure that only valid nodes join the local network, a secure bootstrapping mechanism would be needed. 
Threat vector 2 (V2): Attacks on communications channel among local subnet nodes
This can be caused due to the attacks on short-range radio communications protocols such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), ZigBee, and near-field communication, among others. In the case of BLE, denial of sleep attacks can be especially devastating to the local node clusters. These attacks can reduce the life span of the sensing nodes by several orders of magnitude, rendering the network largely unusable. Other attacks on BLE include eavesdropping attacks, treacherous attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, hostile intrusion in piconet, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack using unit key, and relay attacks. These attacks may vary according to the categor y of shortrange communication protocol used at the local network. 8 To tackle these challenges, some solutions are already proposed; for example, using the keyed hash of the link key could avoid MITM attacks in BLE technology. The idea of cookies would be useful in countering the DoS attacks where multiple authentication requests are sent. The detection mechanism for a hostile intruder can be provided in such a way that information related to a particular piconet is added to the messages, and thus adversaries cannot retrieve the secret message. 
Threat vector 3 (V3): Attacks on communications channel between local network and edge network
Wi-Fi and cellular (that is, 3G/4G) are among the potential communication ways between the local and edge networks. Wi-Fi usually faces some well-explored security attacks such as data interception, DoS, rogue and misconfigured access points, eavesdropping, and end points attacks, among others. 9 In the case of cellular networks, a DoS signaling attack is quite common in the signaling/ control plane in 3G/4G wireless networks. 4G LTE networks are also vulnerable to radio jamming, flooding, spoofing, and bandwidth-stealing attacks. 9 The use of strong wireless authentication and encryption mechanisms in Wi-Fi and cellular can resist the major security attacks such as DoS and reset spoofing as well as the impact of MITM attacks. 
Threat vector 4 (V4): Attacks on edges of the networks
An adversary can target a network/ communication infrastructure of the edges using various attacks such as DoS, MITM, and rogue gateway attacks. The virtualization infrastructure at the edge network may also face major security challenges such as DoS attack, misuse of resources, privacy leakage, and virtual machine (VM) manipulations. 10 Physical damage, privacy leakage, privilege escalation, and a rogue data center are some of the vulnerabilities that can impose various threats to the edge data centers. 
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At the edge network, trust management and an authentication mechanism are crucial because multiple entities at the edge (actors, services, and infrastructures) do coexist. Moreover, the availability of an authorization mechanism is vital to verify the credentials of particular entities requesting certain actions. Apart from the aforementioned methods, intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms are needed to detect the internal and external malicious entities and propose a corresponding defense mechanism. Moreover, countermeasures such as isolation policies, hypervisor hardening, and separation of VM roles should be implemented in all commodity servers to protect the virtualization platforms. 9 Specifically, MEC architecture is vulnerable to DoS attacks when the combination of multiple VMs is spread across several mobile edge hosts. Moreover, a public IP network such as the Internet or a mobile or wide-area network might be used as the underlay network to provide the connectivity between edges. The security holes in the underlay network will also jeopardize the connectivity between edges. 9 Strong authentication mechanisms and encrypted communication should be enabled by an interedge communication channel to prevent unauthorized access to the channel. Secure tunneling mechanisms such as IPsec or secure virtual private local-area-network services (VPLS) can be used to prevent the impact of security weaknesses in an underlay network. 
Threat vector 6 (V6)-Attacks and vulnerabilities on communication channel between edge and global networks
Similar to threat vector V5, the current IP-based communication channel between the edge and global networks is also vulnerable to a full range of IPand web-based attacks. Specifically, the global network side will be exposed to millions of untrusted devices, particularly on the Internet.
Secure tunneling mechanisms such as IPsec or secure VPLS can be used to provide strong authentication mechanisms and encrypted communication to prevent these IP-based attacks. However, the preliminary method to protect the edges from attacks initiated from the Internet is to filter and drop the malicious traffic at the entry point to the edges. Hence, a security gateway should be implemented at the edges. This gateway should contain security functions such as firewalls, deep packet inspection, intruder prevention systems, intelligent distributed DoS (DDoS) mitigation systems, and URL filtering application control.
Threat vector 7 (V7): Attacks and vulnerabilities on global networks (public Internet)
The global network (that is, the Internet) consists of millions of cyberattackers, cybercriminals, and malicious users. As a result, the proposed system is vulnerable to traditional Internet-based attacks such as DDoS, advanced persistent threat (APT), "SYNful knock" attacks, and so forth. Targeted attacks such as APT can also do severe damage when the system becomes a highly desirable target for cybercriminals and cyberattackers. On the other hand, unaddressed software vulnerabilities or service misconfiguration can also lead to system failures. If the firewall is not configured correctly, the system becomes an easy target for unauthorized access. 11 As discussed previously, strong authentication mechanisms and encrypted communication are the key requirement to protect end-to-end (E2E) data transmission. Thus, a comprehensive, multilayered security solution is required to mitigate these Internet-based attacks. Apart from that, the edges should be protected with highly capable security gateways. Moreover, system firewalls and software firmware should be updated regularly to eliminate the known vulnerabilities.
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PROPOSED THREE-TIER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
To mitigate the highlighted security vulnerabilities, we propose a corresponding three-tier security architecture to
THE GLOBAL NETWORK (THAT IS, THE INTERNET) CONSISTS OF MILLIONS OF CYBERATTACKERS, CYBERCRIMINALS, AND MALICIOUS USERS.
counter several attacks at different tiers, for example, DoS, replay, and sinkhole attacks, among others. Note that there are some attacks that are not addressed by this security architecture; for example, in some cases, intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms are required to detect few attacks at local and edge networks. We highlighted some of these attacks and their potential solutions in the previous section.
The main focus of this article is to analyze the possible attacks caused due to the lack of a proper authentication and authorization mechanism at various tiers in a proposed three-tier architecture; thus, we proceed with solutions for such attacks only. Our proposed solution provides not only authentication/authorization but also many other security implications, including access control, secure E2E communication, and secure node bootstrapping. The secure architecture for gadget-free services is vital from two perspectives: 1) smart object bootstrapping and 2) secure user accessibility to the required services.
Smart object bootstrapping
Bootstrapping 12 follows certain methodologies and processes through which one smart object can join a local network. This process will ensure that only authorized smart objects should be able to join the network. Initially, a low-capacity smart object requests to join the local network using root identity (O1.1, O1.2), as shown in Figure 3 . Root identity is a statically configured cryptographic material, which is embedded by the manufacturer for a bootstrapping mechanism. Next, using the root identity, authentication (O1.3) and authorization (O1.4) mechanisms are performed, and eventually the smart object is added to the local network. Once the bootstrapping is successfully done, it generates some further cryptographic material [also known as domain identity (O1.5)]. The domain identity is associated with additional characteristics of the smart node that are related to the deployment domain, such as the owner, and thus can be used for management tasks. Also, domain identity permits a smart object to get identified for the next processes within the local network. The complete identity of the smart object can be described by the domain and root identities.
If the smart object fails to authenticate and authorize itself at the local network, the error request is reported to the error control unit (ECU; O1.3.1, O1.4.1) at the loca l layer. The ECU is responsible for error detection and control mechanisms. Moreover, after bootstrapping, the smart object should also be registered with the local network so that it can be discovered by other available objects within the network. For the registration of a particular smart object, the domain identity (O1.5) is used Low-Capacity Smart Objects FIGURE 3. The smart object bootstrapping and registration mechanism. KeM: key management; AC: access control.
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for authentication (O1.6) and authorization (O1.7). Having the authorized domain identity, the key management unit derives group keys (O1.8) for further secure communications.
To access higher computational services, the smart object needs to be connected with the edge layer. For that purpose, the complete identity (O2.1) is sent by the local identity management (IdM) to the edge layer (O2.2). The authentication (O2.3) and authorization (O2.4) processes are executed at the edge layer. If the smart object is successfully authorized, the access control (O2.5) mechanism is granted (O2.5), corresponding session keys (O2.6) are initiated, and respective services (O2.7) are enabled. Otherwise, in case of failure, errors are reported to the ECU at the local layer (O2.3.1, O2.4.1).
User service accessibility
The secure user accessibility mechanism for the required services can be threefold depending upon the type of services requested (see Figure 4) , that is, authentication with the local layer, at the edge layer, and with global layer.
› Initialization of user's accessibility to local layer services:
The services offered at the local layer tend to be very basic, that is, services having less storage and processing/computation. Therefore, in this case, the local-level authentication will be sufficient, and no further authentication is required at the edge or global levels (as marked by the red cross in Figure 4 ). The secure service accessibility of the user in local infrastructure will potentially comprise the following steps. 1) The new user first requests particular services from the local infrastructure using the biometrics credentials (U1.1). 2) A high-capacity smart object fetches the user's biometrics features for the identification mechanism (U1.2).
3) The user is authenticated (U1.3) and authorized (U1.4) for the local services. 3) The session is initiated, group keys are shared with KeM at both the edge and local networks (U3.7 and U3.9), and services are enabled (U3.10).
Also, corresponding domain identities are generated and shared with IdM at the edge and local networks (U3.6 and 3.8).
DISCUSSION
The proliferation of the IoT and availability of diverse services will enable new modes of accessing digital services, for example, interaction of users in smart environments. This article extends the mode of service interaction further by enabling users to access services without gadgets through intelligent interfaces embedded in the nearby surroundings. Therefore, new service architectures and infrastructures will be required to detect a user, project user interfaces in the user vicinity, initiate user identification, and offer the userintended services accordingly. The user interfaces fade into background once the user completes the tasks and securely terminates the session. Provisioning such services will need a foolproof security architecture to avoid security lapses of user information, restrict the services to legitimate users, and maintain a high level of user privacy. A tier-specific security architecture has been proposed that ensures the security of the service infrastructure by using, for example, secure bootstrapping of nodes or smart objects and ensuring E2E security between the user and the system while the user accesses the services. The authentication and key management mechanisms proposed in the three-tier security architecture are useful and effective in countering most of the previously identified potential security vulnerabilities. However, new security challenges may also arise when such architectures are deployed and used in practice. Therefore, security by design will be the key requirement to mitigate security lapses as much as possible.
Since there will be no gadgets that maintain running sessions while the user is moving, continuity of services during mobility will be highly challenging. From a security point of view, the most prominent challenge will be single-sign-on authentication during roaming from one point of access to another. This means that sessions will be disrupted during mobility because the users will need to authenticate themselves every time they start an interaction with the surrounding interactive objects.
The limitation of the proposed architecture is that the user will always need to restart authentication with the first tier and go gradually to the global services, unlike traditional service architectures that do not require stepwise reauthentication with mobility. The future of such systems will rely on a highly context-aware biometric authentication system coupled with user tracking to directly recognize the user without going through all the steps and provide the services that the user intends to use. One possibility will be the service and security credentials' movement with the movement of the user-anchoring point, such as an interactive connected car used to interact with systems while moving from one place to another.
ith the digitalization of everyday life activities, there is a clear need for various modes of a secure and smart services access mechanism. The gadget-free, hyperconnected environment promises an intelligent and highly context-aware surrounding, where users can access required services anytime without using handheld gadgets. However, to realize this vision completely, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed, more specifically, the security of the whole service architecture. This work proposes a secure three-tier service architecture for such smart and gadget-free environments, lists its security challenges, and proposes solutions for them. 
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